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 Abstract 
 Background and objective. Changes in the Dutch GP remuneration system provided the opportunity to study the effects 
of changes in fi nancial incentives on the quality of care. Separate remuneration systems for publicly insured patients 
(capitation) and privately insured patients (fee-for-service) were replaced by a combined system of capitation and fee-for-
service for all in 2006. The effects of these changes on the quality of care in terms of guideline adherence were investigated. 
 Design and setting. A longitudinal study from 2002 to 2009 using data from patient electronic medical records in general 
practice. A multilevel (patient and practice) approach was applied to study the effect of changes in the remuneration 
system on guideline adherence.  Subjects. 21 421 to 39 828 patients from 32 to 52 general practices (dynamic panel of 
GPs).  Main outcome measures. Sixteen guideline adherence indicators on prescriptions and referrals for acute and chronic 
conditions.  Results. Guideline adherence increased between 2002 and 2008 by 7% for (formerly) publicly insured patients 
and 10% for (formerly) privately insured patients. In general, no signifi cant differences in the trends for guideline adhe-
rence were found between privately and publicly insured patients, indicating the absence of an effect of the remuneration 
system on guideline adherence. Adherence to guidelines involving more time investment in terms of follow-up contacts 
was affected by changes in the remuneration system. For publicly insured patients, GPs showed a higher trend for guide-
line adherence for guidelines involving more time investment in terms of follow-up contacts compared with privately 
insured patients.  Conclusion. The change in the remuneration system had a limited impact on guideline adherence. 
 Key Words:  General practice ,  guideline adherence ,  quality of care ,  remuneration system ,  The Netherlands 
effectively guaranteed in advance, while in an FFS 
system  providers have an incentive to improve the 
quality of services, as patients may be discouraged 
from attending a provider if they have experienced 
inadequate care [7]. However, it has also been 
 suggested that the incentive to provide more ser-
vices in an FFS system might come at the expense 
of quality [8]. 
 A review of the effects of remuneration on the 
quality of care showed only two studies with a rigo-
rous design [3]. One study concluded that paediatric 
residents (students) with an FFS reimbursement 
 Introduction 
 The literature suggests that a fee-for service (FFS) 
system encourages health care providers to provide 
services and not to delegate to other health care 
providers, while a capitation and salary system 
encourages providers to curtail services and more 
often refer to other providers [1 – 6]. The effects of 
these remuneration systems on the quality of care 
are less often discussed. It has been argued that 
health care providers under a capitation or salary 
system have a limited incentive to improve the 
 quality of services, as their payment (per patient) is 
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missed fewer recommended visits compared with 
residents with a salary [9]; the other study found no 
differences in hospital admissions and days compa-
ring FFS only to a capitation system with an additional 
incentive payment for low hospital utilization rates 
[10]. More recently, the effects on the quality of care 
with a change from a capitation system with addi-
tional fees for certain services and target levels of 
services to a salaried system in general practice was 
compared with a control group with continued capi-
tation [11]; no differences were shown in the trends 
between general practices on the quality of care in 
terms of access, communication, overall satisfaction, 
continuity of care, and coordination of care. 
 Changes in the remuneration system of general 
practitioners (GPs) in the Netherlands provided a 
unique opportunity to study the effects of changes in 
fi nancial incentives on quality of care, and thereby to 
contribute to the scarce literature. Most GPs are free 
entrepreneurs in the Netherlands [12]; their income 
depends on the applicable remuneration system. Tra-
ditionally, the Dutch GP remuneration system was 
dependent on the type of insurance carried by the 
patient: public (63%) or private (37%). Below a gross 
annual income of  € 33 000, people were publicly 
insured. For publicly insured patients remuneration 
was based on a capitation system, whereas for pri-
vately insured patients an FFS system was in opera-
tion. GPs act as gatekeepers for secondary care, being 
the fi rst point of contact for medical care in the 
 Netherlands. In 2006, the Dutch government intro-
duced a new Health Insurance Act [13], which abol-
ished the differentiation between publicly and privately 
insured patients. With the revised health insurance 
system, the GP remuneration system changed to a 
combined capitation and modest FFS system for all 
patients (Table I). The differentiation in remunera-
tion between publicly and privately insured patients 
was thought to be undesirable, and could lead to 
 differences in the provision of care between these 
patient groups [14,15]. Also, GPs believed the former 
 remuneration system of capitation for publicly insured 
patients did not reward their time investment. 
 The aim of this paper was to investigate whether 
changes in the GP remuneration system, through dif-
ferent fi nancial incentives, affected GPs ’ guideline 
adherence using longitudinal data from the electronic 
medical records (EMRs) of GPs. Changes in the 
remuneration system of Dutch GPs were not directed 
to improve the quality of care or guideline adherence, 
such as in a pay-for-performance system. However, 
alterations in the remuneration system changed the 
incentives for providing services to both publicly and 
privately insured patients, with an increased incentive 
to provide services for publicly insured patients and 
a decreased incentive to provide services for privately 
insured patients. The number of provided services 
may impact on the quality of care. Therefore, we 
expected an increase in guideline adherence for pub-
licly insured compared with privately insured patients 
(hypothesis 1); this effect may be greater for indica-
tors involving more time investment (hypothesis 2). 
 Material and methods 
 Study design and population 
 This was a longitudinal study analysing differences 
in the trends for guideline adherence from 2002 to 
2009 between publicly and privately insured patients. 
2002 – 2008 EMR data were used from GP practices 
that participated in the Netherlands Information 
 Network of General Practice (LINH) [16]. The 
LINH database contains longitudinal data on the 
patient level in terms of contacts, morbidity, pre-
scriptions, and referrals. General practices are 
recruited based on certain characteristics of the 
practice (for example type of practice and region) to 
attain a representative sample of Dutch general 
practice. The network is a dynamic pool of practices, 
 Few studies have examined the effect of remu-
neration on the quality of care in terms of guide-
line adherence. 
 Guideline adherence increased in Dutch  •
general practices between 2002 and 2008. 
 Changes in the remuneration system for  •
GPs did not have a strong effect on guide-
line adherence. 
 Adherence to guidelines involving more time  •
investment in terms of follow-up contacts 
was affected by changes in the remuneration 
system. 
 Table I. GP remuneration system in 2005 and since 2006 
in the Netherlands. 
2005 Since 2006
Remuneration system
Publicly 
insured
Privately 
insured All insured 1 
Capitation fee:
 Basic capitation fee 2  € 77.00  –  € 52.00
Fee-for-service:
 Consultation    20 minutes  –  € 24.80  € 9.00
 Consultation    20 minutes  –  € 49.60  € 18.00
 Home visit    20 minutes  –  € 37.20  € 13.50
 Home visit    20 minutes  –  € 62.00  € 22.50
 Telephone consultation  –  € 12.40  € 4.50
 Notes:  1 Payments in 2006.  2 Additional capitation fee for older 
people and people living in a deprived area. 
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with yearly small changes in composition. The 
LINH is registered with the Dutch Data Protection 
Authority; data are handled according to national 
data protection guidelines. 
 For guidelines regarding prescriptions, we inclu-
ded only data from practices that passed a  number 
of checks regarding the quality of data on morbi dity 
(care episodes) and prescription and where the 
patient ’ s (former) health insurance type was known. 
For guidelines related to referral data, an additional 
inclusion criterion was the availability of adequate 
referral data throughout the year. Table II shows the 
number of general practices, patients, and decisions 
(each time a GP can decide to adhere to a specifi c 
guideline) per year for both selections: dynamic 
panel. Reason for exclusion were (a) no complete 
data on morbidity/care  episodes (40%: no year-
round data or low degree of morbidity  coding), (b) 
no complete data on prescriptions (10%: low degree 
of morbidity coding) and (c) no patient ’ s  former 
health insurance type (5% in 2007, 15% in 2008). 
Included and excluded general practices did not 
differ with regard to their characteristics, except 
that more general practices from the south of the 
Netherlands were excluded. Overall, these GP prac-
tices were representative of Dutch GP practices in 
respect of the degree of urbanization and region, 
but not in respect of practice type (over-represen-
tation of group practices or health centres and 
under- representation of single-handed practices). 
Additional analyses showed that practice type did 
not largely infl uence guideline adherence. 
 Measures 
 Decision in accordance with guidelines. Sixteen guide-
line adherence indicators were used, based on clinical 
guidelines (Table III) [17 – 18]. The condition-specifi c 
guidelines comprise a range of recommendations and 
considerations that are related to each other and that 
are often ordered in a decision tree. Based on the key 
recommendations that were easy to extract from 
EMRs, quality indicators were developed. 
 Health insurance type. Patient ’ s health insurance type 
in 2002 – 2005 was used from the specifi c year. For 
patients in 2006, 2007, and 2008, the last known 
health insurance type was used. 
 Time investment. The amount of time associated with 
guideline adherence was based on research by van 
den Berg et  al. [19]. Workload was divided into the 
expected workload effect in the actual consultation 
(short-term) and the likelihood that the patient will 
return (long-term). Van den Berg et  al. asked an 
expert panel of three practicing GPs whether the 
amount of work (short- and long-term) was likely to 
be greater, equal to, or smaller when adhering to the 
guideline. Indicators were given a score on the basis 
of the majority of the expert ratings. In the case of 
three different scores, the indicator was scored as 2. 
On the basis of the expected workload in actual con-
sultation and long-term workload effect, we dis-
cerned nine categories (see Table V; for distribution 
in categories see Table III). 
 Statistical analyses. Effects of changes in the remu-
neration system on guideline adherence were analy-
sed for all 16 indicators separately, as well as the 
overall score, and a comparison was carried out 
between indicators which differed with regard to the 
expected short- and long-term workload. 
 Differences in the trends for adherence to 16 
separate guidelines between publicly and privately 
insured patients were analysed by multilevel logistic 
regression analyses (with random intercept, one vari-
ance on patient level, and a variance for each year on 
practice level), using a compound-symmetry model 
with three-level hierarchically structured data (deci-
sions nested within patients, and patients nested 
within general practices) using MLwiN 2.02 (IGLS 
 Table II. Number of general practices, patients, and decisions concerning guideline adherence 
included in the analyses. 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Data regarding guidelines 
related to prescriptions:
General practices 44 52 36 32 52 45 35
Patients (with decisions) 29 704 34 449 23 851 21 421 39 828 32 453 26 722
Decisions 40 582 47 276 33 155 29 718 55 011 45 178 37 891
Data regarding guidelines 
related to referrals:
General practices 38 37 28 27 39 38 30
Patients (with decisions) 8 632 8 373 6 313 5 582 9 427 7 293 5 752
Decisions 9 027 8 815 6 632 5 828 9 873 7 569 5 958
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estimation; 1st order PQL) [20]. The covariates were 
estimated across years, assuming that the effect is 
constant over time. Guideline adherence was taken 
as the dependent variable. We included one dummy 
variable for year, score  “ 0 ” for the years before the 
change in remuneration (2002 – 2005) and score  “ 1 ” 
for the years after the change (2006 – 2008). Publicly 
insured patients were taken as the reference group 
in the analyses (variable  insurance ). We captured the 
effect of changes in remuneration between publicly 
and privately insured patients as the difference in 
trends between publicly and privately insured 
patients over time:  year * insurance . The use of the 
interaction term means that both group-specifi c and 
time-specifi c factors were controlled for, and there-
fore only the effect of the changes in remuneration 
system was estimated. In these analyses, the variable 
 year captured the difference in guideline adherence 
between 2002 – 2005 and 2006 – 2008 for publicly 
insured patients, as publicly insured patients were 
the reference group. Additionally, differences in 
guideline adherence were estimated for privately 
insured patients. 
 The trend in adherence to all guidelines together 
was analysed by cross-classifi ed logistic multilevel 
regression using a compound-symmetry model 
developed by van den Berg et  al. [19]. Decisions 
were nested within patients and patients within 
general practices, but decisions were also nested 
within the different guidelines. The dependent and 
independent variables in the analysis were equal to 
the analyses of individual guideline adherence indi-
cators. As sensitivity analysis, we estimated the 
trend in adherence to all guidelines together for a 
stable panel (11 general practices with 2002 – 2008 
data). 
 To investigate whether trend differences in guide-
line adherence between publicly and privately insured 
patients differed with regard to the expected short- and 
long-term workload, three-way interactions were 
included in separate analyses (for example:  insurance * 
year * smaller short-term  workload ). Every combination of 
the expected short- and long-term workload was taken 
as reference category. By doing so, the interaction term 
 insurance * year represents the effect (and confi dence 
interval) of the remuneration system on guideline 
adherences for the reference category. The difference 
in the trend for guideline adherence was determined 
for seven of the nine categories of labour intensity (two 
were excluded since these combinations were not 
 available in the 16 included indicators; see Table V). 
All analyses were corrected for differences in age (as a 
 Table III. Guideline adherence indicators and their expected workload effect in actual consultation and expected long-term 
workload effect. 
Guideline adherence indicator
Expected workload 
effect in actual 
consultation
Expected 
long-term 
workload effect
Indicators  – prescription:
 1.  Prescribing nitrofurantoin or trimethoprim for patients older than 12 years 
of age with uncomplicated cystitis
Smaller Equal
 2.  Not prescribing antibiotics for patients with acute sore throat Greater Smaller
 3.  Prescribing narrow-spectrum instead of broad-spectrum penicillin when 
prescribing antibiotics for patients with acute sore throat
Smaller Greater
 4.  Not prescribing antibiotics for patients with sinusitis Greater Smaller
 5.  Prescribing fi rst-choice antibiotics (before 2006: ciprofl oxacin  & doxycycline; 
from 2006: ciprofl oxacin  & amoxicillin) when prescribing antibiotics for patient 
with sinusitis
Smaller Greater
 6.  Prescribing diuretics to patient with uncomplicated hypertension instead of other 
hypertension medication
Equal Equal
 7. Prescribing a lipid modifying agent for patient with diabetes Equal Equal
 8. Prescribing an antithrombotic agent for patients with angina pectoris Equal Equal
 9.  Prescribing an antithrombotic agent for patients with transient cerebral ischaemia Equal Equal
10.  Prescribing parasympatholytics and/or beta-2-sympathicomimetics without 
corticosteroids for patients with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD).
Equal Smaller
11.  Not prescribing a proton pump inhibitor to patients with a-specifi c stomach 
complaints
Equal Equal
Indicators  – referrals:
12.  Not referring patients with traumatic knee problem to an orthopaedic surgeon Greater Greater
13.  Not referring patients with osteoarthrosis of the knee to an orthopaedic surgeon Greater Smaller
14.  Not referring patients with Acute otitis media to an ENT specialist Smaller Smaller
15.  Not referring patients with otitis externa to an ENT specialist Smaller Smaller
16.  Not referring patients with atopic eczema to a dermatologist Greater Greater
 Source: Braspenning et  al. (2004 [17]); Braspenning et  al. (2006 [18]). 
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polynomial: age, age 2 , and age 3 ) and gender composi-
tion across years. 
 Results 
 Trends in guideline adherence 
 Guidelines related to referrals were generally more 
often adhered to than guidelines related to prescrip-
tions (see Table IV). The sixth and seventh columns 
of Table IV show the difference in guideline adher-
ence between 2002 – 2005 and 2006 – 2008 for pub-
licly and privately insured patient separately. In 
general, guideline adherence increased between 
2002 – 2005 and 2006 – 2008 for both publicly and 
privately insured patients. Additional analyses esti-
mating the linear trend between 2002 and 2008 
showed signifi cant trends for both publicly and pri-
vately insured patients (not included). Analyses of 
separate indicators showed that in particular indica-
tors related to chronic and cardiovascular diseases 
showed an increase in adherence (numbers 6, 7, 8, 
and 10). Guideline adherence with regard to pre-
scribing fi rst-choice antibiotics for patients with 
sinusitis showed a sharp decline since the reform, 
simultaneous with the change in recommended 
fi rst-choice antibiotics in the guideline, which had 
no thing to do with the reform. Also, indicators 
related to a-specifi c stomach complaints and osteoar-
throsis of the knee showed a decrease in adherence 
between 2002 – 2005 and 2006 – 2008. 
 Effect of the remuneration system on guideline 
adherence 
 To investigate whether the changes in remuneration 
systems, through differences in fi nancial incentives, 
changed guideline adherence, we compared the dif-
ference in guideline adherence between 2002 – 2005 
and 2006 – 2008 between publicly and privately 
insured patients (see eighth column in Table IV). For 
guideline adherence in general, no differences in the 
trends between publicly and privately insured patients 
were found. For 13 out of the 16 indicators, no 
 differences in trends were found between publicly 
and privately insured patients. For indicators regard-
ing the prescription of fi rst-choice antibiotics for 
sinusitis and uncomplicated hypertension, a greater 
increase in adherence was found for privately insured 
patients. In other words, the changes from capitation 
for publicly insured patients and FFS for privately 
insured patients to a combined system of capitation 
and FFS resulted in a greater increase (in the case of 
hypertension) or a smaller decrease (in the case of 
sinusitis) in guideline adherence for privately insured 
patients compared with publicly insured patients, 
whereas for the indicators regarding referral for trau-
matic knee problems the opposite effect was found. 
Sensitivity analysis with a stable panel showed similar 
effects of the remuneration system on guideline 
adherence in general (OR 1.04; 95% CI 0.97 – 1.13). 
 Effect of remuneration on guideline adherence 
to short- and long-term workload 
 For guidelines that were expected to involve a greater 
long-term investment (a greater chance that the 
patient would return to the practice), consistently 
signifi cant lower trends for privately insured patients 
were found in comparison with publicly insured 
patients (see Table V). In other words, guidelines that 
involve a higher chance that a patient would return 
to the practice were signifi cantly more adhered to 
since the change in remuneration in publicly insured 
patients compared with privately insured patients. 
Also, for guidelines that were expected to involve a 
lesser short-term investment (less work in the actual 
consultation), signifi cantly lower trends for privately 
insured patients were found in comparison with 
publicly insured patients. 
 Discussion 
 The purpose of this study was to analyse whether the 
quality of care measured with the aid of guideline 
adherence indicators changed as a result of changes 
in the remuneration system of GPs. In general, 
changes in the Dutch remuneration system of GPs 
 Table V. Estimation of differences in the trend in guideline adherence between publicly 
(reference) and privately insured patients for each combination of expected short- and 
long-term workload 2002 – 2005 vs. 2006 – 2008. 
Expected long-term workload
Expected short-term workload
Smaller Equal Greater
Smaller  0.72 (0.64 – 0.81) 0.98 (0.87 – 1.12)  1.13 (1.05 – 1.21) 
Equal  0.91 (0.84 – 0.98)  1.24 (1.18 – 1.30) n.a.
Greater  0.43 (0.40 – 0.47) n.a.  0.68 (0.60 – 0.76) 
 Signifi cance at p  0.05 (bold). 
62 C. E. van Dijk et al. 
did not affect guideline adherence, contrary to 
hypothesis 1. Adherence to guidelines involving more 
time investment in terms of follow-up contacts 
occurred more often since the reform in publicly 
insured patients compared with privately insured 
patients, in accordance with hypothesis 2. 
 Strengths and limitations 
 We made use of a unique natural experiment regard-
ing changes in the GP remuneration system and 
made use of EMR data, excluding potential socially 
desirable responses. A number of points should be 
considered regarding our study. First, general prac-
tices were selected on the basis of the quality of their 
EMR and may represent a more motivated portion 
of Dutch GPs. Effects of the remuneration system 
on guideline adherence could therefore be different 
in the Dutch GP population, although other Dutch 
GPs showed similar contact rates and types [21]. 
Second, analyses were based on a dynamic popula-
tion. Included general practices varied between 
years, which could have affected the results. For this 
reason, we performed multilevel analyses to correct 
for variations in participating practices between 
years and performed a sensitivity analysis. Finally, 
the expected short- and long-term workload was 
based on the opinion of only three GPs. Unfortu-
nately, we have no information about the represen-
tativeness of these three GPs. 
 Literature 
 Guideline adherences increased between 2002 and 
2008, especially for chronic and cardiovascular 
di seases. The increase in guideline adherence was 
similar for publicly and privately insured patients, 
suggesting the absence of an effect of the change in 
remuneration system on guideline adherence. This is 
contrary to our fi rst hypothesis, but in accordance 
with some other studies on aspects of the quality of 
care [10,11]. The effect that changes in remuneration 
affected adherence to guideline adherence involving 
follow-up contacts supports a study in which the 
number of recommended visits increased due to 
remuneration [9]. In addition, these results are in 
accordance with previous research on changes in the 
GP remuneration system in the Netherlands using 
LINH data also, which showed a higher trend of 
follow-up contacts for publicly insured patients com-
pared with privately insured patients [22]. The absence 
of an effect of changes in remuneration system on 
guideline adherence suggests that other non-fi nancial 
factors, such as medical ethics, may have played a 
more important role with regard to GPs ’ behaviour. 
 The increase in guideline adherences related to 
chronic disease and cardiovascular diseases might 
be explained by the increased attention to these 
di seases. In this time period, chronic diseases such 
as diabetes mellitus and COPD as well as cardio-
vascular  diseases received a lot of attention. For 
example, since 2006, general practices have been 
able to arrange new contracts for primary care 
nurses, who are especially involved in caring for 
patients with chronic and cardiovascular diseases 
[16]. Increases in guideline adherence related to 
chronic diseases were also found in the United 
Kingdom [23]. 
 We showed that changes in the guidelines, as 
demonstrated by the fi rst-choice antibiotic for sinus-
itis, led to a drop in guideline adherence. It seems 
that GPs do not automatically adjust their practice 
style to changes in guidelines, which has also been 
shown in other studies [24,25]. 
 Conclusion 
 To a large extent, GPs seem to do what they need or 
have to do, irrespective of the way they are remuner-
ated. However, guidelines involving a greater long-
term workload in terms of additional follow-up 
contacts were affected by the remuneration system. 
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